Going public with Dual-class structure is a controversial way of accessing capital market as it deviates from one share one vote regime therefore; it is greatly criticized by investors and academicians. It is believed that insiders choose this structure to expropriate minority shareholder's wealth and to extract private benefits. These firms issue multiple classes of shares with different voting rights whereas cash flow rights are identical. This paper gives detail insight to studies carried out on Dual-class firms in the dimensions of determinants, pricing, performance and level of corporate governance. We highlighted gaps and proposed several directions for future research in these dimension.
Introduction
Firms follow one share one vote regime to access capital market whereas, accessing capital market with Dual-class structure is confrontational way, as it strays from one share one vote principal. Firms choose to list with Dual-class structure face criticism from all stakeholders. Violating one share one vote principal means, generating a class of stock which possesses different voting rights from cash flow rights. Firms obtain finance without diluting the founding owner's control by adapting Dual-class structure (D. Valentin 18 ).
We divide literature on Dual-class firms into four major dimensions discussed extensively in the past namely; determinants of Dual-class firms, pricing of Dual-class firms, Performance of Dual-class firms and level of corporate governance of Dual-class firms. The sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 cover detail discussion on these dimensions respectively. We conclude our paper in section 6 where, we also provided directions for future research.
Determinants of dual-class firms
Researchers pay much attention to this dimension and tried to determine the determinants of Dual-class firms while analyzing different countries data set. It is evident from literature that those firms which possess noticeable ownership prior to IPO are most likely to choose Dualclass structure to access capital market (R. Kristian 19 ) find that inclusion of Chinese firm in the IT industry is a predictor of Chinese Dual-class firms. They propose that firms in IT industry largely rely on innovation and innovation does not produce financial benefits in short term so, in order to avoid outside pressure they adapt Dual-class structure. It is admitted by Google's CEO that the outside pressure of meeting quarterly requirements often pushes the company to sacrifice its long term goals. 28 We suggest that future researchers should compare the determinants of Dual-class firms belonging to different countries in order to understand common characteristics of them.
Underpricing of dual-class firms
Underpricing occurs when the offer price of share is below its market value. It is well developed in the literature that underpricing is done to create dispersed ownership structure, considered to be a source of generating excess demand and it is done to prevent large block holders (B. James and C. 8 ). We believe that the data set used by these studies is relatively old and may be at that investors were not fully aware of investment consequences in Dual-class firms therefore, they do not push insiders to underprice share. We believe that insiders should bear the cost of retaining control in the form of underpricing since, investors are fully aware of their investment decisions since, information is readily available in this digital era. Recently, . 19 ) studied the sample of Chinese Dual-class firms and find that Chinese Dual-class firms are 30.42% more underpriced than Chinese single-class firms. Future researchers can investigate whether Dual-class firms face more underpricing by analyzing new Dual-class IPOs as, literature available on this dimension is relatively small and old.
Performance of dual-class firms
The literature on the effects caused by deviating from one share one vote regime on performance of firm has long history. There is a strong debate on whether disproportional voting rights enhance, harm or destroys the shareholder's value. 27 ) find that if interests of insiders and shareholders are not aligned, it will affect performance negatively as insiders try to extract private benefits by investing in value destroying projects.
(Abdullah et al. 35 ) find that Chinese Dual-class firms are performing better than Chinese single-class firms in terms of market performance. They propose that the performance is better as they have bonded themselves to higher standards of U.S. from relatively lower Chinese standards and it is evident from literature that firms which bond themselves to high standards perform better. This should be further investigated whether country laws affect the performance of Dual-class firms as (Abdullah et al. 35 ) find that Chinese Dual-class firms perform better because of high standards of U.S. Future researchers may compare the performance of Dual-class firms listed on different exchanges so, that the effect of exchange laws on performance of Dual-class firms would be perspicuous. 36 ) conclude that insiders of Chinese Dual-class firms are satisfying the concerns of investors by hiring more independent directors and by attracting more institutional investors but controlling them through controversial CEO-Chairman Duality. They also witness that as the divergence between voting and cash flow rights increases, CEOChairman Duality increases. They do not witness any difference in board size. This dimension needs detail investigation by future researchers. To the best of our knowledge, the literature available on this dimension is insufficient to explain whether Dual-class firms possess adequate level of corporate governance. Researchers should also investigate whether governance level of Dual-class firms differs with exchanges on which they are listed.
Conclusion and recommendations
This paper reviews the literature on Dual-class firms and covered its four major dimensions discussed extensively in the past. We highlight important determinants of Dual-class firms, and we propose that study should be conducted in order to compare the determinants of Dualclass firms belonging to different countries. We also discuss literature available on pricing of Dual-class firms. The available literature on this dimension is relatively old; researchers should study pricing of Dual-class firms which have listed recently, as the era has brought up many changes in investment decisions of investors. We then shed light on available literature in the dimension of performance of Dual-class firms. We propose that in future, researchers may investigate the effect of country laws on performance of Dual-class firms. Lastly, we enlighten studies carried out measuring level of corporate governance of Dual-class firms. The literature available on this dimension is quite insufficient, future researchers may study this domain deeply to understand it.
